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THE CONFUSING DEATH OF THE SPECIAL BENEFITS
DOCTRINE IN LOUISIANA EXPROPRIATION LAW
The exercise by the state of Louisiana of its inherent power of
expropriation is restricted only by the federal and state constitu-
tions.' The Louisiana constitution of 1921, which imposes a greater
duty of just compensation than the federal constitution, provides that
a landowner shall be compensated for the land actually taken and
the damages sustained by the remainder as a result of the taking (i.e.,
severance damages).2 In determining the total compensation for the
expropriated land, Louisiana has statutorily denied the consideration
of any benefit which the remaining land may have experienced from
the project. :' However, Louisiana courts have recognized the rule
1. The United States Constitution's requirement in the fifth and fourteenth
amendments that private property not be taken unless just compensation is paid has
been interpreted in Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897): "The just compensation
required by the Constitution to be made to the owner is to be measured by the loss
caused to him by the appropriation. He is entitled to receive the value of what he has
been deprived of, and no more."
2. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
except by due process of law. Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, private
property shall not be taken or damaged except for public purposes and after just and
adequate compensation is paid." (Emphasis added.) For a detailed discussion of this
requirement see Comment, 26 LA. L. REV. 91 (1965); Comment, 19 LA. L. REV. 491
(1959).
Article 1, Section 4 of the newly adopted Louisiana constitution (effective January
1, 1975) provides: "Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy,
protect, and dispose of private property. This right is subject to reasonable statutory
restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power.
"Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions
except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner or into court
for his benefit. Property shall not be taken or damaged by any private entity author-
ized by law to expropriate, except for a public and necessary purpose and with just
compensation paid to the owner; in such proceedings, whether the purpose is public
and necessary shall be a judicial question. In every expropriation, a party has the right
to trial by jury to determine compensation, and the owner shall be compensated to the
full extent of his loss. No business enterprise or any of its assets shall be taken for the
purpose of operating that enterprise or halting competition with a government enter-
prise. However, a municipality may expropriate a utility within its jurisdiction. Per-
sonal effects, other than contraband, shall never be taken.
"This Section shall not apply to appropriation of property necessary for levee and
levee drainage purposes."
3. LA. R.S. 19:9 (1950): "In estimating the value of the property to be expropri-
ated, the basis of assessment shall be the value which the property possessed before
the contemplated improvement was proposed, without deducting therefrom any
amount for the benefit derived by the owner from the contemplated improvement or
work."
See also LA. CIv. CODE art. 2633 (which states the identical formula).
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adopted by other states that certain benefits which accrue to the
remaining land should be considered in determining the net amount
of compensation due for severance damages.' Louisiana courts have
also adopted the distinction that the expropriating authority is enti-
tled to an offset for "special" benefits but not for "general" benefits
in the computation of severance damages. 5 The application of this
distinction has been recognized as one of the most complex and diffi-
cult problems of expropriation law.'
The "Special Benefits" Doctrine
The "special benefits" doctrine in Louisiana was definitively
stated in 1941 by the Louisiana supreme court in Louisiana Highway
Commission v. Grey:7
The benefits or advantages, if any, which may result from the
construction of the work are either general or special. General
benefits are those which are shared alike by all property owners
in the neighborhood or community. Such damage as a property
owner may sustain as a result of the construction and use of a
public work cannot be offset by these general benefits ...
The rule is different as to peculiar or special benefits or those
affecting a particular estate by reason of its direct relationship to
the improvement. If, as a result of constructing a new work, the
remaining land or part of it is left fronting on a road or street and
the land fronting the road or street is more desirable and more
valuable because of the frontage, the advantage thus gained is a
special or peculiar benefit, and damages to the remaining prop-
erty may be offset by such benefits.'
4. See Louisiana Hwy. Comm'n v. Hoell, 174 La. 302, 140 So. 485 (1932) (and
cases cited therein). For a complete annotation of the various nuances of the doctrine
of ollset, see Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1149 (1967) (which supersedes Annot., 145 A.L.R. 7
(1943) for highway condemnation cases). See also Recognition of Benefits to Remain-
der Property in Highway Valuation Cases, Report No. 88, NATIONAL COOPERATIVE HIGH-
WAY RESEARCH PROGRAM (1970).
5. See, e.g., Louisiana Hwy. Comm'n v. Hoell, 174 La. 302, 306, 140 So. 485, 486
(19:2), which specifically held that general benefits could not be offset against sever-
ance damages. Its definition of "general" as the "benefit or advantage that might
result generally to all of the owners of lands adjacent to or in the vicinity of the
highway" was replaced by a more specific one in Louisiana Hwy. Comm'n v. Grey, 197
La. 942, 2 So. 2d 654 (1941).
6. DAKIN AND KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA 86-87 (1970); 3 NICHOLS, THE
IAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.62 (1965); Gleaves, Special Benefits in Eminent Domain:
Phantom of the Opera, 40 CALIF. ST. B.J. 245 (1965); Haar and Hering, The Determina-
tin of Benefits in Land Acquisition, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 833 (1963).
7. 197 La. 942, 2 So. 2d 654 (1941).
8. Id. at 961-62, 2 So. 2d at 660-61.
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In Grey the remaining rural farm tract was found to have suffered
severance damages by the partial taking for the construction of a new
highway. However, these damages were found to be offset by the
enhanced value of the remaining property now available as building
lots fronting the new highway; the court found that this increased
value was a special benefit not shared by the community generally.'
In defining the term "special," the Louisiana supreme court re-
lied on United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., " in which the
United States Supreme Court applied a federal statute" specifically
requiring an offset of special benefits against severance damages and
compensation for land actually taken. In River Rouge the Supreme
Court found that all the riparian owners along the river subject to the
project experienced special benefits which entitled the Government
to an offset.'2 The existence of special benefits was not affected by the
fact that all property in the area served by the river benefited gener-
ally from the increased river activity,' :' nor by the fact that more than
one piece of property experienced a special benefit." Therefore, the
9. Id. at 960, 2 So. 2d at 660. The supreme court confronted the same factual
situation as in Grey' and again found special benefits in State, Dept. of Hwys. v.
Cooper. 213 La. 1016, 36 So. 2d 22 (1948).
10. 269 U.S. 411 (1926).
I1. 33 U.S.C. § 595 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 18, 1918, c. 155, § 6,
40 Stat. 911). For a discussion of the statute and its recent application see Kaskell,
The Prohlems of the Owner in Federal Condemnation, 27 LA. L. REv. 43 (1966).
12. The case involved the claims of fifteen riparian landowners whose land had
been partially taken for the straightening and deepening of the River Rouge.
13. In United States v. River Rouge Imp. Co., 269 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1926), the
United States Supreme Court applied the following reasoning which was quoted and
adopted by Gre': "We are of the opinion that an increase in the value of the remaining
port ion of any parcel of land caused by its frontage on the widened river, carrying a
right of immediate access to and use of the improved stream, would constitute a special
and direct benefit, within the meaning of the statute, as distinguished from a benefit
common to all lands in the vicinity, although the remaining portions of other riparian
parcels would be similarly benefited. This is in accordance with the rule recognized
by this court and established by the weight of authority in the state courts in reference
to special benefits to lands abutting upon a new or widened street." (Citations
omitted.)
14. The Louisiana supreme court declared that the fact that other property en-
joyed t he same benefit, would not destroy the benefit's special nature. The court quoted
the Massachusetts supreme judicial court in Allen v. Charlestown, 109 Mass. 243, 246
(1872), which was also quoted by the United States Supreme Court in River Rouge,
269 U.S. at, 416.
"The benefit is not the less direct and special to the land of the petitioner, because
other estates upon the same street are benefited in a similar manner. The kind of
henefit, which is not allowed to be estimated for the purpose of such deduction, is that
which comes from sharing in the common advantage and conveniences of increased
public facilities, and the general advance in value of real estate in the vicinity by
[Vol. 34
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court in Grey specifically rejected defendant's contention that the
enjoyment of the same benefit by other frontage owners transformed
a special benefit into a general benefit."5
In Grey the term "special" was given an expansive meaning
which included all increases in property value except those shared by
the entire community or vicinity. General and special benefits were
not considered to be mutually exclusive. The problem was to catego-
rize the myriad of benefits caused by a single public improvement
and then to place a proper valuation on those determined to be spe-
cial. Those additional benefits (increases in value), not shared by the
community at large, would then be set off against severance damages
in determining the amount of compensation, if any, due the land-
owner.
Recent Jurisprudence
Characterization of the Benefits
Subsequent to Grey, and until recently, it could "be fairly stated
that there is a presumption of special benefits in any taking for a road
or highway project."' 7 However, an analysis of recent cases which
reason thereof .... The advantages of more convenient access to the particular lot of
land in question, and of having a front upon a more desirable avenue, are direct
benefits to that lot, giving it increased value in itself. It may be the same, in greater
or less degree, with each and every lot of land upon the same street. But such advan-
tages are direct and special to each lot. They are in no proper sense common because
there are several estates, or many even, that are similarly benefited. Louisiana Hwy.
Cornm'n. v. Grey, 197 La. 942, 963, 2 So. 2d 654, 661 (1941).
15. The court stated the defendant's argument to be "that, because other lands
which front on the highway will be benefited, the benefits to the defendant's land are
not special, but general." Judge Odom replied, "[Defendant's] counsel are mis-
taken." Louisiana Hwy. Comm'n v. Grey, 197 La. 942, 963, 2 So. 2d 654, 661 (1941).
16. Id. at 964, 2 So. 2d at 661. citing with approval, Wilson v. Greenville County,
110 S.C. 321, 325-26, 96 S.E. 301, 303 (1918), where the South Carolina supreme court
stated the rule to be as follows: "The benefits derived from such improvements are
classed as general and special. The general are such as are enjoyed by all people in
the community. The special are such as are peculiar to one or more persons by reason
of the more favorable location of their lands with reference to the highway. Those who
own land immediately on a highway derive advantages which are not shared by others
in the same community. These special benefits usually find concrete expression in a
comparatively greater increase in the value of such lands, though they may not be, and
often are not, the only special benefit which they enjoy. But certainly, to the extent
that the benefits accruing to those who own lands on the highway exceed those of their
neighbors whose lands are off the highway, they are special. A benefit that is limited
in enjoyment to one or more persons is special to him or them. Therefore the fact that
all persons who own land adjacent to the road enjoy special benefits does not make
such benefits general."
17. DAKIN AND KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LouISIANA 86-87 (1970). The authors
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involve the claim of special benefits to remaining land located on an
interstate highway interchange evidences a departure from this pre-
sumption and seriously questions the entire doctrine of special bene-
fits.'5 For example, in State, Department of Highways v. Martin," the
Third Circuit stated:
The courts, in this state and elsewhere, are virtually unanimous
in holding that where the improvement benefits the community
as a whole it is general; and where it benefits an individual it is
special. The courts are divided when the problem falls into the
area of benefit to the neighborhood which is what we have here.2'
This is an unfortunate over-simplification of the Louisiana rule.2 ' All
public improvements are intended in varying degrees to benefit the
community, neighborhood and contiguous property. The court's
analysis incorrectly implies that a general benefit excludes the exist-
ence of a special benefit. The issue is not the nature and extent of
the total improvement caused by the project, but rather the extent
to which the remainder property's benefits exceed those of the com-
suggest the following distinction: "Perhaps the most satisfactory distinction between
general and special benefits describes general benefits as those which arise from the
fulfillment of the public object which justified the taking and special benefits as those
which arise from the peculiar relationship of the land in question to the public im-
i)rovernent.
"This does not mean, however, that a benefit is disqualified as special merely
because a like benefit is enjoyed by many other tracts contiguous to the same improve-
ment. A defendant landowner cannot successfully argue that since other lands fronting
on a highway will be benefited, the benefits to his land are general. The advantages
may be the same in greater or less degree for every tract of ground, but such advantages
to each are direct and special."
18. All the cases discussed were initiated by the State Highway Department under
the Quick Taking Statutes. LA. R.S. 48:451-60 (1950).
19. 219 So. 2d 548 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969). The subject property was located on
the northeast quadrant of the interchange of Interstate 10 and Louisiana Route 725
about one and one-half miles north of Lafayette.
20. Id. at 550.
21. According to 3 NICHOUS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.6202 (1965), there
are three natural classes of benefits arising from a public improvement. However in
section 8.6203 Nichols states: "In cases arising out of the exercise of the power of
eminent domain the natural classification set out in the proceeding section [§8.62021
is not adopted and benefits are arbitrarily divided into two classes, general and special,
the special benefits including the peculiar benefits and to some extent the local ones."
Additionally, the court in Martin states that "Like most general rules, which
sound both wise and simple when bandied about in purely philosophical or academic
circles, the rub comes when the principle is dropped into the crucible of specifics, to-
wit: Who gets, or keeps, the money?" 219 So. 2d at 550. While the rule of setoff is
concededly vague, there is no need to compound the confusion by introducing a balanc-
ing test of interests.
[Vol. 34
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munity at large. The project (i.e., the improvement) does not have
one "benefit" which can be characterized as either general or special;
therefore, the court must look at the property and determine the
relationship of its benefits to those of the community or general
area.2 The fact that the general area experienced a rise in value does
not determine the nature of all the benefits to the subject land; in
most instances the project will enhance the value of all the land in
the area and produce general benefits.': The court's task is then to
determine how the specific piece of property has benefited in excess
of other property in the economic region.
In contrast to Martin the Third Circuit in State, Department of
Highways v. William T. Burton Industries, Inc.2" recognized that all
property within a reasonable distance of the interchange and highway
would appreciate in value, but that this fact alone would not affect
the determination of special benefits. In Burton the state attempted
to prove through the use of comparable sales at other interchanges,
that the remainder property would increase in value to a greater
extent than neighboring land and thus receive a special benefit from
the project. In rejecting the state's claim of special benefits, the court
seemed to aggregate certain factors 'r which would indicate special
benefits and other factors which would be useful in the proper appli-
cation of the comparable sale technique to show increased value in
relation to neighboring land, which is a special benefit in itself. It is
22. It can be seen, that in weighing the evidence in Martin, the court indulged in
a non sequitur when it said: "The evidence shows that all of the land in the area of
the new interchange gained in value as a result of its projected location. However, this
gain in value was general as to all land in the area, whether or not part of the tract
was taken for the new improvement. The preponderance of the evidence supports the
trial court's determination that the increase in value of the subject tract was a general
benefit, and thus not available as an offset against severance damages." Louisiana
Dept. of Hwys. v. Martin, 219 So. 2d 548, 550 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
23. See, e.g., United States v. River Rouge Imp. Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926) (im-
provement of a river); McCoy v. Union Elev. R.R., 247 U.S. 354 (1918) (effect of
construction of intra-city railroad. Merchant's premises were found to have been spe-
cially benefited by the construction of the Chicago Loop).
24. 219 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969). This Interstate 10 interchange was
located four miles from Lake Charles at Chloe.
25. Id. at 843. In its evaluation of the state's claim of special benefits, the court
listed six factors to be considered in determining the relationship of the property to
the project: (1) the volume of traffic, both from the Interstate and the cross highway;
(2) the position of the remainder with regard to being the most available for motorists
leaving the expressway; (3) the visibility of the property to expressway motorists before
they reach the exit ramp; (4) readiness of access to and from the expressway and the
entrance ramp; (5) the location of the interchange with regard to population centers;
and (6) competing sites at the same or nearby interchange.
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not clear" however whether the court rejected the state's comparable
sales or found no increase in value. It is preferable to read the court's
opinion as rejecting, as not comparable, those sales offered by the
state in order to avoid the conclusion that each interchange property
is to be compared to property at other interchanges and not with the
neighboring land. Such a reading would allow Burton to be consistent
with Grey which clearly held that special benefits were to be deter-
mined by the subject land's benefits vis-a-vis land within the neigh-
boring vicinity.
Increase of Remainder's Value as a Benefit
The use of increases in fair market value as a reflection of special
benefits was at issue before the First Circuit in State, Department of
Highways v. Mayer27 where the effect of a possible zoning change was
considered in relation to the value of the remaining land. Following
the precedent of City of Monroe v. Natasi,21 the court held that the
26. For example, the court after listing these factors said, "In most of these as-
pects, the subject property was deficient, as compared with the properties relied upon
by the Department as comparable," but concluded, "the evidence indicates that com-
mercial development will more likely take place at interchanges with more favorable
attributes, and that the present quadrant-remainder has received no appreciation in
value because of its location near the present interchange." Id. at 843-44.
27. 257 So. 2d 723 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied 261 La. 460, 259 So. 2d
913 (1972). This land occupied three quadrants of the interchange of Interstate 10 and
the Acadian Thruway, a major four lane north-south artery in Baton Rouge.
28. 175 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965). See also City of Monroe v. Carso, 179
So. 2d 696 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965) (which also followed the rationale enunciated by
United States v. Meadow Brook Club, 259 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1958).
The use of zoning changes to determine highest and best use is consistent with
recent California jurisprudence. See People v. Donovan, 57 Cal. 2d 346, 19 Cal. Rptr.
473, 369 P.2d 1 (1962): "Where there is a reasonable probability that zoning restric-
tions will be altered in the near future, the jury should consider not only those uses
currently permitted, but also other uses to which the property could be devoted in the
event of such a change. [Citations omitted.] The jury is entitled to and should con-
sider those factors which a buyer would take into consideration in arriving at a fair
market value, were he contemplating a purchase of the property [Citations omitted.]
and it is manifest that plausible and probable changes in the character of the neighbor-
hood and in zoning restrictions in an area constitute such factors." Id. at 352, 19 Cal.
Rptr. at 476, 369 P.2d at 4. A lower California appellate court applied the above rule
to partial takings when it reasoned: "Since a reasonable probability of rezoning may
be taken into consideration in fixing present market value of property taken [Citation
omitted.I, it would seem that such probability of rezoning might also be taken into
consideration in determining the matter of special benefits." People v. Hurd, 205 Cal.
App. 2d 16, 22, 23 Cal. Rptr. 67, 70 (1962). The court found no error in permitting
plaintiff's expert testimony of the probability of a zoning change as a result of the
construction. For a discussion of these cases see Gleves, Special Benefits in Eminent
Domain: Phantom of the Opera, 40 CAL. ST. B.J. 245, 253 (1965).
[Vol. 34
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reasonable possibility of a zoning change for purpose of determining
the "highest and best use" must be shown to have existed at the time
of taking and that the zoning change had to be the result of the
project. In so holding, the court failed to differentiate between Natasi
which involved valuation of the expropriated land which is deter-
mined at time of taking,"' and severance damages which must be
determined at the time of trial.:"' Similarly, special benefits should be
computed at the time of trial after consideration of the reasonable
possibility of a zoning change at the time of trial which would more
clearly reflect the effect of the improvement on the remainder. This
must be the method to avoid the unacceptable result of having sever-
ance damages computed on a different basis than correlative special
benefits; otherwise, it would be permissible for the defendant to claim
severance damages based upon the reasonable possibility of commer-
cial use while calculating special benefits according to residential
use.'.
The requirement by Mayer that for a reasonable possibility of a
29. LA. R.S. 48:453 (Supp. 1954): "The market value is determined as in general
expropriation suits but as of the time the estimated compensation was deposited in
the registry of the court.
"Damage to the remainder of the property is determined as of the date of the trial.
"In either case the defendant has the burden of proving his claim."
30. The court's position is found in the following passages: "The Department's
request for a remand to show a rezoning of the subject property to Commercial classifi-
cation following the time of trial must be denied. We believe the legislature has wisely
and properly restricted proof of damages in these cases to such reasonable possibilities
as exist at. the time of taking, as reflected by the circumstances existing at the time of
trial. We find the evidence preponderates in favor of the conclusion that the zoning
change to A-4 which occurred following the taking in this instance cannot be attributed
to the construction of the expressway and interchange, but rather that such change
resulted from circumstances independently of the taking and construction involved
herein." Louisiana, Dept. of Hwys. v. Mayer, 257 So. 2d 723, 740 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1971). Later the court stated: "[TIhe Department did not establish that a zoning
change for other purposes was reasonably possible at the time of taking."Id.
31. The need for a mutual time frame was recognized by the court in Burton
Industries when it said: "In our view, however, the provision that severance damages
be valued as of the date of the trial was statutorily intended to specify that the
damages the remainder suffers should be reduced by special benefits which result to
it from the completion of the highway construction .... " 219 So. 2d 837, 842 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1969). Additionally, the supreme court has recognized the need to use the
same time when it said in dicta: "[lit is the special benefit which exists at the time
of trial which is pertinent. La. R.S. 48:453. That is to say, speculative benefits can no
more be considered than can speculative damages. 3 NicHoLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN, § 8.6203 (1965)." State, Department of Hwys. v. McPherson, 261 La. 116, 138,
259 So. 2d 33, 41 (1972). See also State, Dept. of Hwys. v. Reymond, 255 La. 425, 231
So. 2d 375, 383-84 (1970); Tate, Legal Criteria of Damages and Benefits: The Measure-
ment of Taking-Caused Damages to Untaken Property, 31 LA. L. REv. 431, 440-42
(1971).
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zoning change to be considered it must be caused by the project is
not logically necessary in all cases. In determining the "highest and
best use" for purposes of appraisal, changes caused by the project are
excluded in determining the value of land taken.3 2 However, for sever-
ance damages and their offset, which are computed at time of trial,
the project's damage and benefit should be considered with regard to
the land's "highest and best use" at that time regardless of the factors
influencing the determination of the best use. Thus, the possible or
actual zoning change may be a special benefit if caused by the pro-
ject, but regardless of causation it should be considered in computing
the highest and best use of the property which will then be the basis
for determining whether the subject property has increased in value
disproportionately to the general area.
Tacit Rejection of the Doctrine
The issue of special benefits has been the subject of two recent
supreme court decisions. In State, Department of Highways v.
McPherson,:  the state claimed special benefits because (1) the pro-
ject permitted the defendant to sell dirt from the remainder property
to the contractor building the highway and (2) the remainder of the
property increased in value because of its location. The court rejected
both contentions and awarded severance damages.34 The claim of
32. See LA. R.S. 19:9 (1950) at note 3 supra.
33. 261 La. 116, 259 So. 2d 33 (1972). This land was located at the intersection of
Interstate 20 and Louisiana Route 577 near Waverly.
For other recent decisions in this area which are not discussed see State, Dept. of
Hwys. v. Crow, 286 So. 2d 353 (La. 1973) (no affirmative showing of special benefits
by state); State, Dept. of Hwys. v. Hoyt, 284 So. 2d 763 (La. 1973) (severance damages
found as a result of more inconvenient access to service station); State, Dept. of Hwys.
v. Neyrey, 260 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972) (special benefits found because of
location on service roads); State, Dept. of Hwys. v. Brandt, 247 So. 2d 876 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1971) (special benefits found accruing to land located at Interstate 20 inter-
change in Shreveport-use of comparable sales demonstrated rise in value per square
fot); State, Dept. of Hwys. v. Thurman, 231 So. 2d 692 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970)
(special benefit was found to offset any severance damage-benefit was due to land's
proximity to city of Bogalusa and its enhanced residential value).
34. Two other issues besides the claim of special benefits as reflected by increases
in value confronted the court. The first involved the state's claim of special benefits
from the sale of dirt to the contractor building the highway at a price twice the value
per acre of the land actually taken. In rejecting this claim the court stated: "Thus, in
the case before us where dirt is sold to the contractor from the remainder of McPher-
son's land and the same contractor and others acquired dirt from other landowners in
at least six other locations, in the area of the highway right of way, the benefit is not
special to McPherson. It is instead general to those located near the right of way who
have the type soil desired and who are willing to sell.
"The lands of six other landowners who sold to the contractors were not affected
[Vol. 34
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increased value was rejected as being too speculative in nature,3 5 as
benefits were not shown to be a reality at the time of trial. If the court
meant that there had not been any increase in the fair market value
of the land at the time of trial as a result of its location, then its
conclusion is not questionable. To read the decision as requiring that
the benefit be in actual existence at time of trial would produce a
decision in contradiction to prior jurisprudence. It is rare that the
benefit will immediately occur; the potential need only be sufficiently
definite to permit valuation. By looking to what a willing buyer would
pay a willing seller, the courts have permitted increases in market
value to be used as one method to indicate that special benefits will
by expropriation and were not damaged by the highway construction. Therefore no
deduction can be made from the price they received for the dirt sales. Under these
circumstances justice does not require that McPherson put back a substantial part of
the amount realized from his dirt sale to offset severance damages to his property. To
permit such an offset would be to compel McPherson to bear a greater proportion of
the cost of the public improvement than others." 261 La. at 136, 259 So. 2d at 40.
This reasoning seems to ignore two factors in favor of the state. First, the causal
relationship is more than that of project and demand for dirt. The defendant was able
to receive an artificially high price because his dirt was adjacent to the project which
eliminated any transportation expense to the contractor. This benefit allowed the
defendant to collect for the dirt a price twice what he was paid per acre for land
actually expropriated. Secondly, any existing equity in favor of the defendant was
rebutted by the fact that the severance damages being claimed by the defendant were
in fact caused by the excavation for the dirt as pointed out by the dissent: "But
conceding that we are faced with contradictions in regard to severance damage to the
north, we have the answer by the landowner himself through the clear, unequivocal
testimony of his expert Williams. Williams negates absolutely, positively, and categor-
ically the testimony of the landowner's other appraiser, Sevier, and the engineer.
According to Williams, the only damage to the north remainder is that caused by the
landowner when he allowed 12 acres of the north remainder to be excavated to fulfill
his contract for the sale of dirt. Williams' expert conclusion is that the partial taking
in no manner adversely affected the north remainder, and that the north remainder
suffered no severance damage. Id. at 147-48, 259 So. 2d at 44.
The second issue involved the cost of constructing a bridge under the "cost-to-
cure" approach of severance damage computation. Here the majority used both the
cost-to-cure approach and the before-and-after market value test without regard to the
fact that the after value by definition includes the effect of the splitting of the land
into two tracts without a bridge permitting transit between the two. Therefore, the
landowner's after valuation of the remaining land was reduced as a result of this defect
(thus increasing the difference between the before and after which is the severance
damage) while compensation was being paid to correct this defect; in effect, a double
recovery. See State, Dept. of Hwys. v. Mason, 254 La. 1035, 229 So. 2d 89 (1969) (which
states that the "cost-to-cure" approach in determining damages should be used only
in most unique situations).
35. The court stated: "Thus, no enhancement in value to the land surrounding
the interchange having been shown as of the date of the trial, the speculation that an
increase in value is forthcoming cannot be considered in mitigation of damages to the
remainder. Nichols, § 8.6201." Id. at 138-39, 259 So. 2d at 41.
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be actually experienced. Fluctuations in the market value will com-
pensate for the "Imlany circumstances [thatl could occur before
the highway is completed which would prevent the predicted en-
hancement of value. '"'7 To require an actual realization of a benefit
would permit an owner to have his property double in value because
of the location of an exit ramp and avoid special benefits by saying
that he has neither sold the property nor has the ramp been con-
structed.
Finally, the court makes the following statement which casts
doubt on the entire doctrine of special benefits:
Aside from the speculative character of the values at the
interchange, another factor enters into the resolution of this issue.
The record does not adequately establish that the benefit to ac-
crue to McPherson's property in the event of an increase in the
value of lands at the interchange will be a special benefit. As the
testimony of the Department's own witnesses disclose [sicl, the
enhancement in value will not be peculiar to McPherson's prop-
erty alone. To a diminishing extent, the property from the imme-
diate vicinity of the interchange and for a distance therefrom
along Highway 577 will also benefit when the interchange is com-
pleted should a benefit in fact result.
Except for the McPherson property and one other tract, the
other property to be benefited by completion of the interchange
is unaffected by expropriation and it will be damaged by the
construction of the highway. In other words, in this neighbor-
hood, all property will be enhanced but only McPherson must
pay now by offset for a future speculative benefit. We think not.:
The court in the first paragraph seems to have come full circle
from Grey which recognized that although there may be varying de-
grees of increased value in the vicinity of the project, certain tracts
of land would still benefit specially as a result of their location. The
implication in McPherson is that the court now considers there to be
only one type of benefit caused by a project: either general or special.
Furthermore, the state must prove that the enhancement in value is
peculiar to the defendant alone which in effect destroys the distinc-
tion between general and special except in the rarest circumstances.
The effect of such a result is to discard the entire prior jurisprudence
constructed upon Grey and its progeny.
:16. See. e.g., State, Dept. of Hwys. v. Brandt, 246 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1971): State, Dept. of Hwys. v. Mouledous, 200 So. 2d 384 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
:17. State, Dept,. of Hwys. v. McPherson, 261 la. 116, 139, 259 So. 2d 33, 41 (1972).
38. Id. at 139-40. 259 So. 2d at 41. (Emphasis added.)
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Furthermore, McPherson seriously erodes the entire special ben-
efits doctrine by questioning the equity basis upon which Grey is
founded. Grey and decisions of other states considered it inequitable
and illogical for a landowner to claim that his remaining property was
damaged by the taking when in fact the property had increased in
value as a result of the project precipitating the severance. The courts
following the rationale of Grey refused to countenance such a windfall
at the expense of the public.
Subsequent to McPherson the supreme court confronted the
issue in State, Department of Highways v. Trippeer Realty
Corporation:  and in terms not wholly consistent with McPherson
further narrowed the application of special benefits. In reversing the
First Circuit's finding of special benefits based upon comparable
sales, the court made the following statement:
While the Highway Department's experts, for differing reasons,
testified to particular enhancement in value of the defendant's
property because of its proximity to the interchange, defendant's
experts on the contrary testified that defendant's property en-
joyed no greater benefit than other properties in the vicinity of
the interchange (perhaps even less because of the disadvantages
of a portion of the property being placed off the Airline Highway
and on a frontage road); and that all such enhancement along the
Airline Highway near the interchange was not identifiably the
consequence of proximity to the interchange so much as general
appreciation as a consequence of the coming of the highway."'
The requirement that all enhancement to the frontage owners be
shown to be special clearly contradicts McPherson which would re-
quire that the benefit to the affected property be shown peculiar to
it alone and not shared by any other tract of land. Additionally,
Trippeer ignores the original jurisprudence which clearly concedes
that part of any enhancement will be general but that the existence
of general benefits does not exclude special benefits to the property.
In the future, the expropriating authority must either show that the
benefit inures exclusively to one piece of property alone in order to
claim an offset under McPherson, or that all the project benefits
experienced by the frontage owners were not shared by the com-
munity in order to be entitled to an offset under Trippeer.
The movement by the Louisiana courts has been to discard the
principles of Grey by narrowing extremely its application or rejecting
39. 276 So. 2d 315 (La. 1973).
40. Id. at 321-22.
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it sub silentio. Additionally, Justice Summers in McPherson4 ques-
tions the equity basis of Grey by arguing that it is inequitable through
the offset of special benefits to make the landowner whose property
is taken from him bear a greater burden than that borne by his
neighbors who have not suffered any loss and have benefited from the
project. This position is contrary to the opinion of commentators42
and courts 1:1 which have reconsidered the doctrine. The more logical
rule is to offset all benefits. This would permit the use of the before-
and-after test of valuation to determine the compensation due for
damages to the remainder. Such a test is easier to apply than the
Louisiana two-step procedure of characterization and valuation; it
merely calls for a valuation of the remainder before the project and
after the project." In determining the fair market value of the prop-
41. See also Tate, Legal Criteria of Damages and Benefits-The Measurement of
Taking-Caused Damages to Untaken Property, 31 LA. L. REV. 431 (1971).
42. See, e.g., Bishop & Phelps, Enhancement in Condemnation Cases, VALUATION
FOR EMINENT DOMAIN 104 (E. Rams ed. 1973); Peacock, The Offset of Benefits Against
Losses in Eminent Domain Cases in Texas: A Critical Appraisal, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 1564
(1966). It was suggested that "Texas courts give careful consideration to adopting the
Louisiana rule that a superhighway presumptively confers a special benefit where the
market value abutting land is increased." Id. at 1582; Haar & Hering, The Determina-
tion of Benefits in Land Acquisition, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 833 (1963); Bishop & Phelps,
Enhancement in Condemnation Cases, 13 ALA. L. REv. 123 (1960).
43. Bishop and Phelps report that: "An analysis of decisions throughout the coun-
try indicates a tendency by courts to expand the definition and application of special
benefits to include virtually all benefits accruing to the remaining property-a tend-
ency to look to the actual market value of the property as affected by the improve-
ment." Bishop & Phelps, Enhancement in Condemnation Cases, in VALUATION FOR
EMINENT DOMAIN 104, 112 (E. Rams ed. 1973). For an extensive discussion of the
.jurisprudence see State v. Bailey, 212 Ore. 261, 319 P.2d 906 (1957). In Bailey, the
Oregon supreme court yielded to the weight of authority and followed the rule adopted
by Grev permitting the offset of special damages only. However, the Oregon court
adopted the doctrine of special benefits reluctantly, as it stated that the more prefera-
ble and logical rule was to offset all benefits. Additionally, the court gave an expansive
meaning to the term "special benefits."
Additionally, the New Mexico supreme court in Board of Comm'rs. of Dona Ana
County v. Gardner, 57 N.M. 478, 483-84, 260 P.2d 682, 685 (1953) stated: "The trend
throughout the nation is toward considering all benefits in the determination of dam-
ages in condemnation cases. This trend is nurtured by the policy of the state in trying
to bring down excessive costs of rights-of-way so as to make the money appropriated
and available for roads and other public improvements go as far as possible. It is
possibly due also to some extent to a gradually changing concept of the sacred charac-
ter of real property ownership which thus gradually is altering the basic theory of 'just
compensation' in condemnation cases."
44. The greater ease in application is now even more important in light of the new
constitution which guarantees a trial by jury in expropriation cases. Such a test would
reqlire the jury to make only two valuations of the remainder land based upon two
distinct periods; that is, at the time of trial without considering the project and with
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erty strictly on the basis of before and after the project, all the various
factors of damage, benefit, speculativeness and possibilities of
changes in use, are placed into the crucible of the "fair market
value." The result would be eminently fair because a person cannot
claim that his property has been damaged when in reality the market
price has not been decreased.415
There would not seem to be any constitutional impediment to
the adoption of such a rule. In fact, in attempting to evaluate sever-
ance damages only, the courts have followed this procedure." The
difference in fair market values is made complete by including in the
computation of the "after" market value, the effects of the project on
the value; that is, actual fair market value. If the court insisted that
general benefits not be included as an offset, the deduction could be
by a percentage. It would not be difficult to ascertain with some
specificity the average percent increase in value accruing to all the
property of the community as a result of the project. 7 This percent
of increase attributable to general benefits would then be deducted
from the "after" market value for comparison with the "before" value
to determine the amount of damage. The definition of "general" as
postulated in Grey would provide an adequate base to compute a
sufficiently representative factor and would follow Grey's prescrip-
tion that all benefits except general benefits (i.e., everything in ex-
cess) should be offset.
The recently enacted state constitution provides that a land-
owner be compensated for "the full extent of his loss" as a result of
expropriation.' This would seem to provide impetus to discarding the
general-special distinction which has heretofore troubled the-courts.
If the landowner is to be made whole for his entire loss, equity would
require that all accruing benefits of the project be offset in determin-
the entire effect of the project considered. The loss for which compensation would then
he due would be the difference in value, if any.
45. See Haar and Hering, The Determination of Benefits in Land Acquisition, 51
CALIF. L. REV. 833, 868-81 (1963).
46. "It is well settled in our jurisprudence that the damages allowable under
Section 2 of Article I of the Constitution of 1921, resulting from expropriation of
property rights, is the difference between the market value of the property for sale or
rental purposes immediately before and immediately after expropriation. State, Dept.
of Hyws. v. Central Realty Invest. Co., 238 La. 965, 978, 117 So. 2d 261, 265 (1960).
47. See. e.g., Michigan Wisconsin Pipeline Co. v. Sugarland Devel. Corp., 221 So.
2d 593 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969). The court found that high pressure gas pipeline depre-
ciated the value of nearby land by 30 percent. In State, Dept. of Hwys. v. Trippeer
Realtv Corp., 256 So. 2d 683 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971) (The court found 35 percent of
the increase in value attributable to special benefits. The finding of any special bene-
fits was later reversed.
48. See note 2 supra.
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ing his actual loss. In so doing, the affected landowner is not treated
any differently from his neighbor who must bear both loss and dam-
ages for which he does not receive any compensation. The inconveni-
ence and benefit accruing to the nonexpropriated landowner must be
borne by all members of the community for the benefit of the com-
mon good. If the landowner is to be reimbursed for his entire loss,
then surely one must offset all the advantages which the affected
landowner will experience as a result of the project. Secondly, it must
be remembered that the greater the individual landowner is permit-
ted to profit above his actual loss at the expense of the public, the
more costly and less frequent public improvements become. Recur-
ring inequities resulting from offsetting all benefits could be remedied
by legislation."' In any event, the public taxpayer who is not so for-
tunate to own land near the improvement must be protected in the
determination of what is "just" compensation.
Philip K. Jones, Jr.
49. For example, this was done in the area of relocation assistance. See LA. CONST.
art. IV., section 6 (1972) and LA. R.S. 38:3101-09 (Supp. 1971), which were enacted
pursuant to the mandate of 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1970).
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